Introduction

Accountability Through and Within Arab Judiciaries
Independence of the Judiciary
Authority of The Judiciary
Internal Mechanisms of Accountability
Specific Cases
- Egypt
- Kuwait
- Jordan
- Morocco
Future Steps

Arab Parliaments: Potentialities and Problems
The Historical Development of Parliaments in The Arab World
Constitutional Provisions
Constitutional Gaps
Legal Framework for Executive Accountability
Specific Cases
- Egypt
- Kuwait
- Jordan
- Morocco
Future Steps

Introduction:
In the era after independence, institutional mechanisms of accountability were systematically underdeveloped in Arab governance. In retrospect, the debilitating effects of such a strategy is clear, but it was motivated not simply by a desire of authoritarian rulers to maintain power but also by a determination to build a strong state apparatus capable of guaranteeing security against both internal and external threats. Those countries pursuing a vision of “Arab socialism” generally aimed not simply at self-preservation but also at realizing social justice and national independence. Such goals were sometimes explicitly used to justify avoiding strict separation of powers: old elites resistant to change and hostile foreign powers could not be confronted with a weak and divided state. Those more conservative states eschewing socialism still generally did little to foster genuine accountability.

Such attitudes—whether publicly proclaimed or privately observed—augmented an already existing trend strengthening Arab executives. In most Arab states, an unchecked executive branch antedated the establishment of separate judicial and legislative frameworks. European powers generally sought to insulate executives (over whom they felt they had more influence) from executives during the period of imperial rule. Yet in the past two decades, many in the Arab world have turned sharply away from acceptance of such ideas. Unchecked executive authority is now often seen as the fundamental problem in Arab governance. Much of the Arab world has thus seen a limited and uneven trend towards enhancement of mechanisms of accountability. Judiciaries and legislatures are generally more independent than they were a generation ago, and they are beginning to use some tools to hold executive authorities accountable to the law and the people. However, leadership commitment to further development in this direction is evident in only a small number of Arab states at present.

Nevertheless, the seeds may have been planted that will allow energetic and imaginative judicial and legislative actors to activate mechanisms long dormant in Arab constitutional systems. The tools available to judiciaries and legislatures differ, as do the nature of the accountability they offer. Judiciaries can work to hold executive authorities accountable to the text of the law (and to general principles of the rule of law). Legislatures can hold ministers and cabinets politically responsible to the popular will and use the legislative and budgetary processes as oversight tools.

Four countries have been selected for specific focus: Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco. All four have taken some serious steps towards enhancing the ability of judiciaries and legislatures to play an oversight role; at the same time, their efforts range at best from the embryonic to the incomplete. Consideration of the four cases will show the possibilities for accountability in Arab governance as well as the limitations of past attempts.